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Attorney General v. Covington & Burling-The United States
District Court for the District of Columbia held that although the
attorney-client privilege exists within the context of the Foreign
Agents Registration Act, the court will determine by an in camera
inspection the confidentiality of particular documents.
INTRODUCTION
The complex dealings inherent in international business
transactions have given rise to a problem faced by all nations:
distinguishing between the business and political transactions of
a government. A corollary problem is the proper understanding
and classification of foreign agents-those who represent govern-
ments during these transactions.
The United States, while recognizing the need to protect the
public from the dangers which might be engendered by covert,
undisclosed agents, has at the same time sought to avoid allowing
unwarranted fears to interfere with the crucial activities of foreign
agents. The proper balance was thought to be found in the For-
eign Agents Registration Act of 19381 [hereinafter referred to as
Act]. "The Act is intended to protect the interest of the United
States by requiring complete disclosure by persons acting for or
in the interests of foreign principals where their activities are
political in nature or border on the political."'2 Since its inception,
however, and due in part to numerous amendments to the Act,
there has been confusion as to who must actually register, what
records they must keep, and to whom they are to be disclosed.
I. BACKGROUND
Covington & Burling [hereinafter referred to as C&B] is a
Washington, D.C. law firm which registered pursuant to the Act
in 1967 as an agent for the Republic of Guinea on a project to
exploit its bauxite resources.3 This arrangement, in great part,
entailed negotiations with foreign corporations interested in min-
ing the bauxite and the negotiation of loans from the World Bank
and from various developmental agencies and domestic banks.4
C&B also advised Guinea on various contract claims arising out
1. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1970).
2. H.R. REP. No. 1470, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 2 (1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2398.
3. Attorney Gen. v. Covington & Burling, 411 F. Supp. 371, 372 (D.D.C. 1976).
4. Id.
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of bauxite transactions, and represented it in a New York State
court in a contract dispute regarding Guinea's exhibit at the 1964
World's Fair.
In January 1975, the Justice Department, pursuant to sec-
tion 615 of the Act,5 sought review of the records kept by the firm
concerning its representation of Guinea.' The firm was willing to
divulge only ninety-five percent of the requested records. Approx-
imately 1,000 pages were withheld as confidential communica-
tions protected by the attorney-client privilege.7 The documents
were acknowledged to have related to "nearly every area in which
the firm [had] assisted Guinea."' 8 The Attorney General re-
quested a mandatory injunction ordering the firm to allow the
Justice Department to examine the withheld records The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia in
Attorney General v. Covington & Burling"° examined the issue
of whether the Act recognizes an attorney-client privilege. It held
that the privilege exists under the Act, but the court is to decide,
after an in camera inspection, which documents are to remain
confidential.
II. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The concept of the attorney-client privilege has changed
greatly as society's priorities have changed. The original theory
supporting the privilege was "the consideration for the oath and
the honor of the attorney rather than for the apprehensions of his
client."" By the end of the eighteenth century, this theory had
been repudiated by the rationale that the "judicial search for
truth could not endure to be obstructed by a voluntary pledge of
secrecy, nor was there any moral delinquency . . . in breaking
one's pledge under force of law."'" From these divergent views has
arisen the present theory, which combines justice and pragma-






10. Id. at 371.
11. 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughten rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited
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restricting the court's access to all pertinent information are out-
weighed by the benefits to justice which an open interchange
between client and attorney will foster. 3 The doctrine recognizes
the apprehension with which a client normally approaches his
legal advisor,1 4 and seeks to alleviate it.' 5
The general rule today is that the privilege applies to com-
munications made during any consultation for legal advice, re-
gardless of whether litigation is pending or an actual controversy
exists." The courts allow the privilege to exist because of the
positive effect it is deemed to have on the orderly and efficient
administration of justice." Nevertheless, the extensive abuses
made possible by the extension of the privilege have caused the
courts to apply the privilege strictly.'"
As in the instant case, courts have often found it necessary
to distinguish legal matters from essentially business-oriented
services. Business advice given by a lawyer is not a strictly legal
matter, and is not privileged.'9 "The mere fact that a person is
an attorney does not render as privileged everything he does for
and with a client.""0 A recent demarcation of the privilege was
13. 411 F. Supp. at 373.
14. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 11.
15. The converse consideration is that due to the attachments and loyalties that
develop between attorney and client, it is unreasonable to expect a lawyer to divulge his
patron's closely held confidences. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87 (2d ed. E. Creary 1972).
16. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 11.
17. The presumption is that if the client is free to communicate frankly with his
attorney, the attorney will be able to render the soundest legal advice which would lead
to a "just resolution" of the dispute. See Fischer v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976);
8 WIGMORE, supra note 11, at § 2290 et seq.; McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87 (2d ed. E.
Creary 1972).
18. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 289 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass.
1970). This antitrust action precipitated claims of the attorney-client privilege by various
in-house and outside attorneys for the corporate defendant. In brief, the court allowed the
privilege as to all the documents in question, except those prepared by the patent depart-
ment. The decision enumerated standards by which to determine the applicability of the
privilege. It emphasized the element of confidence between the parties and the legal
posture of both the party offering the advice and of the advice being sought; the analysis
lay the groundwork for painstaking attempts to classify situations within the fine catego-
ries delineated, and often has led to very limited allowances of the privilege. Id. at 358-
59. See In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1973); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas
Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
19. In re a Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
20. United States v. Bartone, 400 F.2d 459, 461 (6th Cir. 1968). Therefore, ministerial
and clericil services performed by an attorney are not privileged. Id. Uncomplicated real
estate dealings do not fall within the scope of the privilege, Pollack v. United States, 202
F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1953), nor do activities done in the capacity of an agent having a power
of attorney, Banks v. United States, 204 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1953). For example, in Under-
19771 CASE COMMENTS
enunciated in a decision arising out of the International Business
Machines antitrust litigation.21 It was there held that the privi-
lege does not attach to communications concerning company pol-
icy, including those regarding the settlement and negotiation of
contracts.
22
A further limitation on the scope of the privilege is particu-
larly relevant to the field of international law. A document which
does not reveal confidential information, 23 or which is intended by
its character to be transmitted to a third party without legal
approval,24 is not a privileged communication.25 Related to this
limitation is the concept that the privilege extends only to mat-
ters communicated to an attorney in professional confidence.
Therefore, the identity of a client, the fact that a person is a
client, and certain basic information showing the nature of the
relationship are not generally items of information which an at-
torney may refuse to disclose.21 It might be contended that since
a foreign corporation doing business abroad must apprise itself of
the laws of the host nation, the existence of a statute such as the
Foreign Agents Registration Act gives it notice that the type of
information requested by the Act is "intended to be seen by third
parties" and therefore cannot be privileged.
The existence of the attorney client privilege, despite the
water Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1970), a trade
secret case, an attorney was called upon to testify regarding work done in the preparation
of patent applications for his client. The court held that such activities do not constitute
legal advice, and are not privileged. See also Georgia Plywood Co. v. United States Ply-
wood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). There, Judge Kaufman stated: "[Clom-
munications dealing exclusively with the solicitation or giving of business advice, or with
the technical engineering aspects of patent procurement or with any other matters which
may as easily be handled by laymen are not privileged." Id. at 464.
21. United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 206 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
22. Id. at 214.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 215.
25. Many cases dealing with the element of confidentiality have arisen out of disputes
between attorneys and the Internal Revenue Service. Best known is Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), in which the court held that an order demanding the
production of retained income tax returns does not violate the attorney-client privilege,
since by their nature, tax returns are meant to be seen by a third party and are therefore
not confidential. Id. at 638. Similar conclusions have been reached with respect to bank
deposit slips and checks. See Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969).
26. 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 503(a)(4)[02] (1976). Weinstein states the general rule
to be that the name of a client is not confidential. Id. However, United States v. Lee, 107
F. 702 (E.D.N.Y. 1901), and In re Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d 214, 168 N.E.2d 660, 203 N.Y.S.2d
838 (1960), are cited as contra to the general rule. Id.
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
narrow boundaries within which it has been confined, has long
been and continues to be attacked." Wigmore states:
[T]he privilege remains an exception to the general duty to
disclose. Its benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruc-
tion is plain and concrete. . . .It is worth preserving for the
sake of general policy, but it is nonetheless an obstacle to the
investigation of the truth. It ought to be strictly confined within
the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its
principle.28
McCormick is even stronger in his criticism. "If one were legislat-
ing for a new commonwealth, without history or customs, it might
be hard to maintain that a privilege for lawyer-client communica-
tions would facilitate more than it would obstruct the administra-
tion of justice. ' 29 More recently, the United States Supreme
Court reiterated these sentiments by stating that "since the privi-
lege has the effect of withholding relevant information from the
fact finder, it applies only where necessary to achieve its pur-
pose."30
III. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE UNDER THE AcT
As previously mentioned,3' the growing political activities of
foreign powers in the United States32 led Congress to enact the
Foreign Agents Registration Act.3 The major problem that had
arisen under the Act was determining whether a particular person
27. One of the first to attack the privilege was Jeremy Bentham. He argued that only
if the entire truth were divulged could justice be done. His criticism was in part based
upon the view that the privilege protected no one other than the guilty party. BENTHM,
A TREATISE ON JUDIcUL EVIDENCE 246-47 (1825).
28. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 11, at § 2291.
29. McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87 (2d ed. E. Creary 1972).
30. Fischer v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). This case involved a transfer
of tax returns from defendant's accountants to his attorneys. The attorneys refused to turn
them over to the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to criminal and civil investigations
being conducted by the Service into the affairs of the defendant. The court held that no
privilege exists and ordered the documents produced. Id.
31. See text accompanying notes 1 & 2 supra.
32. See H.R. REP. No. 1381, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
33. The Act requires that every "agent of a foreign principal" must file a complete
registration statement with the Attorney General, unless exempted under section 613. 22
U.S.C. § 611(c) (1970). The registration statement must disclose the particulars of the
agent's activities for his foreign principals. The agent must also file copies of any political
propaganda which he publicizes on behalf of a foreign principal. Id. § 614. Congress
empowered the Attorney General to require that certain records relating to activities
subject to disclosure under sections 612 and 614 be kept by the agent, and that the
Attorney General's delegate be permitted to inspect the records. Id. § 615.
[Vol. 1111:2
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was a foreign agent.34 In Attorney General v. Covington & Burl-
ling,35 a new problem arose-whether the traditional attorney-
client privilege protected all confidential communications be-
tween a lawyer who is a foreign agent and his employer. The court
found two policies involved when the attorney-client privilege is
claimed under the Act. One purpose of the Act is to enable the
public and the federal government to learn which foreign interests
have a "substantial effect on American life through agents oper-
ating in this country." But the Act also seeks to accomplish this
objective without unduly burdening these foreign agents. The
compromise solution which the court reached reflects the diffi-
culty in reconciling these two policies.
Judge Sirica's decision appears to have been based upon an
erroneous premise. After reviewing the Act, he concluded that "it
is somewhat difficult to see how the values that the attorney-
client privilege is designed to protect could be in danger here"37
since the information sought by the government would be re-
vealed to only a few Justice Department agents and the chance
of "leaks" to the public was slight. For some unexplained reason,
however, the court concluded that although under the same cir-
cumstances the attorney-client privilege would not protect a
domestic principal, it would protect a foreign principal.38
"[H]owever unreasonable it may appear to be, foreign interests
might well doubt that officials of the Justice Department would
or could keep the information disclosed to them confidential." 39
This reasoning seems tenuous. It has consistently been held
that in cases of national security and foreign policy, traditional
rights and privileges may be subordinated to the national inter-
ests." The United States Supreme Court has stated that "to pre-
serve its independence, and give security against foreign aggres-
sion and encroachment, it is the highest duty of every nation, and
34. See Rabinowitz v. Kennedy, 376 U.S. 605 (1964); Attorney Gen. v. Irish N. Aid
Comm., 346 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1080 (1972).
35. 411 F. Supp. at 371.
36. Id. at 376.
37. Id. at 373.
38. Because there is no express provision in the Act which deters an official in the
Justice Department from "leaking" information, the court's distinction between a so-
called public disclosure and disclosure to the officials of the Justice Department is particu-
larly curious.
39. 411 F. Supp. at 374.
40. Attorney Gen. v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 346 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
1977]
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to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be sub-
ordinated. It matters not in what form such aggression and
encroachment come . ",41
In Attorney General v. Irish Northern Aid Committee,4 2 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York stated that under the Act, a foreign agent must disclose
membership information. Although such information is usually
protected by the first amendment, 4 when this right was balanced
against the United States government's interest supporting dis-
closure under the Act, the balance tilted strongly in favor of the
government. "The governmental interest may fairly be said to
outweigh any possible infringement of the First Amendment
rights of members or contributors. ' 44 The basis for the strong
government interest was the "indisputable power of the Govern-
ment to conduct its foreign relations and to provide for the na-
tional defense," the court added.45 It therefore appears that the
rights of foreign principals should be narrowly construed.
These cases directly apply to the instant case. There appears
to be no reason why, if an agent of a domestic principal is required
to make complete disclosure, that an agent of a foreign principal
would not be required to do so under similar circumstances.
There should have been a complete disclosure by C&B in this
case unless the withheld documents fell within one of the two
statutory exemptions.
46
Section 613(g) exempts from filing "any person qualified to
practice law, insofar as he engages or agrees to engage in the legal
representation of a disclosed foreign principal before any court of
law or any agency of the Government of the United States."4
Because this subsection limits the traditional attorney-client
privilege 8 to communications made in contemplation of litiga-
tion,49 it might not cover all communications that were made in
41. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367
U.S. 1, 96 (1961), quoting Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
42. 346 F. Supp. at 1384.
43. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
44. 346 F. Supp. at 1391.
45. Id. at 1390.
46. It is impossible to ascertain whether or not C&B was entitled to the statutory
exemptions since the firm was willing to have it assumed for the purposes of this case that
it was not. 411 F. Supp. 371, 372 n.1.
47. 22 U.S.C. § 613(g) (1970).
48. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 11, at § 2294.




The other filing exemption is found in Section 613(d). This
subsection exempts "any person engaging or agreeing to engage
only: (1) in private and non-political activities in furtherance of
a bona fide trade or commerce of such foreign principal or (2) in
other activities not serving predominantly a foreign interest
. . -' However, the court held that this section applies when
the agent is engaged solely in exempt activities.5 1 If he engages
in any non-exempt activities complete disclosure is required, i.e.,
both the non-exempt and the otherwise exempt activities would
be subject to disclosure.
52
Concluding that only limited exemptions are available under
sections 613(d) and (g), the court went on to inquire whether the
attorney-client privilage may be applied to foreign agents despite
the disclosure provision of section 615. That section states, inter
alia:
Every agent of a foreign principal registered under this act shall
keep and preserve while he is an agent of a foreign principal such
books of account and other records with respect to all his activi-
ties, the disclosure of which is required under the provisions of
this act, in accordance with such business and accounting prac-
tices as the Attorney General, having due regard for the national
security and the public interest, may by regulation prescribe as
necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the provisions
of this act. . . . Until regulations are in effect under this section
every agent of a foreign principal shall keep books of account
and shall preserve all written records with respect to his activi-
ties. Such books and records shall be open at all reasonable
times to the inspection of any official charged with the enforce-
ment of this Act.1
3
By regulation, the Attorney General has ordered that an agent
keep "all correspondence [and] memoranda . . . relating to the
registrant's activities on behalf of or in the interest of any of his
foreign principals."54
Because section 615 requires that the agent preserve all writ-
ten records with respect to his activities, the court found no con-
50. 22 U.S.C. § 613(d) (1970).
51. 411 F. Supp. at 374.
52. Id.
53. 22 U.S.C. § 615 (1970).
54. 28 C.F.R. § 5.500(a)(1) (1975) (emphasis added).
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gressional intent to exclude confidential communications.5 The
court also concluded that the statute was drafted without consid-
ering the attorney-client privilege." The court, however, appears
to have overlooked a 1966 House of Representatives report57 which
implied that the attorney-client privilege was intended to operate
only when it involved an activity exempted by section 613(d).
According to that report, no exemption would exist if the foreign
agent engaged in any non-exempt activity. Nevertheless, the
court decided without much difficulty that the records of the
confidential communications between a foreign principal and its
agent-attorney are included under section 615 and the regulations
established by the Attorney General.1 On the question of disclo-
sure, the court evenly weighed the "purposes" of the Act, i.e., it
balanced the government's interest in ascertaining the effect on
American life of agents operating in this country, against the
desire to accomplish this without unnecessarily burdening the
agents. 9
In light of Attorney General v. Irish Northern Aid Com-
mittee"0 and the 1966 House Report61 this reasoning must be re-
jected. Because of the dominant governmental interest in this
area it would be more logical to conclude that the statutory ex-
emptions exist to lift some of the burden from the agents.
However, it does not follow that because of the existence of these
statutory exemptions other non-statutory exemptions may be in-
ferred. On the contrary, because of the dominant governmental
interest and the intent of Congress, the statutory exemptions
should be deemed to be exclusive."2
55. 411 F. Supp. at 375-76.
56. Id.
57. H.R. REP. No. 1470, supra note 2. The House Report states: "A specific exemption
for attorneys for representation of foreign clients in the courts and before administrative
agencies is contained in [section 613(g)], but the day-to-day, routine activities of attor-
neys in advising and counseling with foreign clients will continue to be exempt under this
section. When advice is given or assistance is rendered with the intent to influence govern-
ment policy, the agency is engaged in political activity and the exemption will not apply."
Id. at 9-10, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2405.
58. 411 F. Supp. at 376. The relevant regulations are found at 28 C.F.R. § 5.500(a)(1)
(1975).
59. 411 F. Supp. at 376. The court derives the second purpose from the fact that
exemptions exist in the statute. Id.
60. 346 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
61. H.R. REP. No. 1470, supra note 2.
62. A major area which is beyond the scope of this comment is the application of the
Bill of Rights and other constitutional guarantees to agents of foreign principals. This
issue was raised but not discussed in United States v. Finance Comm. to Re-Elect the
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CONCLUSION
The Covington & Burling holding establishes a dangerous
precedent: the allowance of an in camera inspection creates the
possibility that documents essential to vital government interests
will not be revealed. Such a result is contrary to the motivation
underlying the enactment of the Foreign Agents Registration Act,
that is, to create a level of uniformity by which the government
may gain access to the records of foreign agents.
It is unlikely that the documents involved in this case could
have attained the status of legal communications. Although the
Act seems to recognize an attorney-client privilege for exemption
purposes, the privilege cannot be claimed as to section 615 re-
cords, which were never intended to encompass substantively
legal matters in the first place. Therefore, the court created great
confusion by implying that the firm could have asserted the
attorney-client privilege with respect to these documents. Where
the law is clear as to the scope of a privilege, the public should
not be invited to challenge the courts at every turn. Furthermore,
in unnecessarily subordinating the interest of the federal govern-
ment, the court has failed to heed Judge Learned Hand's caveat:
"The suppression of truth is a grievous necessity at best, more
especially when as here the inquiry concerns the public interest:




President, 507 F.2d 1194, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
63. McMann v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1937).
1977]
